Research

RESEARCH INTERESTS:  Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Market Design, Auction Theory, Behavioral Economics, Bounded Rationality, Experimental Economics, Political Economy


I am particularly interested:

- In the issue of Efficiency and Information aggregation in Market institutions and in the design and experimental test of existing and new mechanisms.

- In incorporating insights from Behavioral economics, Psychology, Bounded Rationality to design better performing mechanism, or to understand better existing ones.


You can find a summary of my Research here:   RESEARCH OUTLINE


      




PUBLISHED and FORTHCOMING PAPERS:




We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders and takeovers in which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e. the first best, is not implementable. Our first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it is prone to rushes, i.e. all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second best can be implemented with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also show how this result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule.

We introduce a novel motive for the use of a reserve price as an instrument to raise auction revenues in ascending auctions. The effect  that we stress is of inducing coarser information aggregation. The reserve price may prevent information revelation because bidders cannot precisely observe at which price other bidders leave the auction. In simple settings where valuation functions are not symmetric, this may increase the expected revenue of the auction. To illustrate this motive, we exhibit an example in which  the use of a reserve price increases revenue even though there are always at least two bidders active for prices higher than the reserve price.



 We provide a natural setting in privatizations in which the equilibrium of the first price auction gives greater expected surplus than any equilibrium of the open ascending auction.




We analyze a rationale for hiding information in open ascending auction formats. We focus on the incentives for a bidder to call a price higher than the highest standing one in order to prevent the remaining active bidders from aggregating more accurate information by observing the exact drop out values of the opponents who exit the auction. We show that the decision whether to allow jump bids or not can have a drastic impact on revenue and efficiency.

We show that jump bids can be used by a bidder to create a winner's curse and preserve an informational advantage that would otherwise disappear in the course of an open ascending auction. The effect of the winner's curse is to create allocative distortions and reduce the seller's expected revenue. Two novel features of equilibrium jump bids are derived. First, the jump bid may fail to hide completely the value of the common value component. Second, a bidder with a higher type might jump bid less frequently than a bidder with a lower type.



Does the type of posterior feedback affect how people decide in one-shot environments? We revisit this question in first-price auction markets. We consider three feedback types: minimal (only knowing whether winning or not), loser (also knowing the winning bid) and winner (knowing the second highest bid if winning). Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay (“Auction with Anticipated Regret: Theory and Experiments,” American Economic Review, 2007, 54(4), 809-819) find that loser as opposed to minimal or winner feedback increases bids. We use three novel protocols and additionally replicate theirs. Using a sample of 624 subjects, we find that bidders’ ex ante knowledge of posterior feedback type has no systematic effect on the average bid/value ratios.


          We show that the commitment to not allocate may be exploited by a seller/social planner to increase the expected social surplus that can be achieved in the sale of an
          indivisible     unit. 


We study the second best in a single unit sale to two bidders. This is the allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus subject to the biddersʼ incentive compatible constraints when the first best is not implementable. We prove that Maskinʼs (1992) result that any first best allocation that is deterministic and monotone can be implemented with the English auction carries over to the second best.





      WORKING PAPERS:


  • "How to Boost Revenues in FPAs? The Magic of Disclosing only Winning bids from Past Auctions", with Philippe Jehiel and Peter Katuscak

  • "Electoral Competition with Dynamic Campaign Contributions", with Andrea Mattozzi

  • "Signaling in a Private and Common Value Environment"

  •  "Promoting Entry via Reserve Prices"



WORK IN PROGRESS:


  • “The Old and the New World”, with Topi Miettinen 

  • “Transparency in Dynamic Contests”, with Levent Celik













 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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