------------------------Tenure Application Files of Fabio Michelucci-------------------------------

Welcome to my Tenure Application Page, which will be kept regularly updated. 

(last update: 29/10/2015)

Please find below the links to the following documents:

  • Papers in the Tenure Package:
  • "Second Best Efficiency and The English Auction" with Angel Hernando-Veciana, Games and Economic Behavior 73 (2011), 496–506   
  • "On the Optimality of not Allocating", with Angel Hernando-Veciana, Economics Letters 125 (2014), 233-235
  • "Does Feedback Really Matter in One-Shot First-Price Auctions? 
    ,with Peter Katuscak and Miroslav Zajicek,    
    Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization,119 (2015), 139-152
  • "Hiding Information in Open Auctions with Jump Bids" with David Ettinger, Economic Journal (2015), forthcoming
  • "Inefficient Rushes in Auctions", with Angel Hernando-Veciana, Under Review at the Rand Journal of Economics 
  • "How to Boost Revenues in FPAs? The Magic of Disclosing only Winning bids from Past Auctions", with Philippe Jehiel and Peter Katuscak (NEW DRAFT COMING SOON)

    • Other Research Papers in Progress:
    • "Electoral Competition with Dynamic Campaign Contributions", with Andrea Mattozzi (FIRST DRAFT COMING SOON)
    • "Creating a Winner's Curse via Jump Bids", with David Ettinger, revision requested by Review of Economic Design
    • "Manipulating Information with Reserve Prices", with David Ettinger (FIRST DRAFT COMING SOON)
    • "Signaling in a Private and Common Value Environment" (DRAFT IN THE FALL)