PRESENT APPOINTMENT
 
Assistant Professor, CERGE, Sept. 2009 to present
Researcher, Economics Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Sept. 2009 to present
 
PAST APPOINTMENTS
 
Postodctoral Scholar, Caltech, 2007-March 2009 (supported by Prof. Goeree’s Dutch NSF Grant VICI
453.03.606)

Assegnista di Ricerca (Researcher)  at Bocconi University, 06/2006-12/2006

Teaching Assistant, University College London 2002-2006

EDUCATION

University College London, Ph.D. in Economics 2007
Universitat Pompeu Fabra, M.Sc. in Economics 2001
University of Florence, B.A. in Economics (Summa cum Laude) 2000

RESEARCH INTERESTS

Microeconomic Theory, Industrial Organization, Auction Theory, Experimental Economics

TEACHING FIELDS

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization

HONORS, GRANTS AND AWARDS

Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economica, Award for the paper “Second Best Efficiency in Auction”
(joint with Hernando-Veciana), 2005
Ente Luigi Einaudi Scholarship, 2003-2004
Bank of Italy scholarship (Bonaldo Stringher), 2001-2003
Mario Landi Award, Amici di Villa Favard, University of Florence, 2001-2002

RESEARCH PAPERS

“Second Best Efficiency in Auctions” with A.Hernando-Veciana, Submitted
We characterize the incentive compatible allocation that maximizes the expected social surplus in a single-unit sale when the efficient allocation is not implementable. This allocation may involve no selling when it is efficient to sell.  We then show that the English auction always implements the second best allocation when there are only two bidders, but not with more than two. Our model employs a unidimensional type space with independent types and allocative externalities, but captures some features of models with multidimensional types.

“Hiding Information in Open Auctions”
The defining characteristic of an open format is that it allows to aggregate extra information on top of the one that is available ex-ante. This paper shows that bidders may have an incentive to strategically manipulate this extra flow of information by employing jump bids.We show that jump bidding can have a dramatic impact on equilibrium behavior and affect revenues and efficiency in an ambiguous manner. Contrary to the common belief that jump bids are anti-competitive, it may also result in higher revenues and efficiency.

“Pre-emptive Bidding and Information acquisition”

We study an auction setting with two bidders one of whom is better informed regarding the realization of a common value component of the object on sale. The bidder with the ex-ante coarser information  can become as well informed as the initially advantaged bidder, but at a cost. We analyze the incentives to place a pre-emptive bid that discourages information acquisition and show how such incentives vary with the relative size of the common component  and on whether the informed bidder knows how her value decomposes into a private and a common value part or not. We also evaluate the effects of a jump bid on the auction's revenue and efficiency.

WORK IN PROGRESS

“Information Aggregation with private and common values”, with Jacob Goeree
“Efficient Jump Bidding”, with Hernando-Veciana

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

University College, London 2002-2006
Courses taught: Microeconomics, Industrial Economics, Money and Banking

LANGUAGE SKILLS

Italian: native, English: fluent, Spanish: fluent, Portuguese: advanced, French: intermediate, German: beginner

PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES

Talks : SISL seminar, Caltech; invited seminar University of Helsinki; Econometric society world congress 2005; Auction and Mechanism Design conference, Consip;  6th Spanish Game Theory Meeeting, 11th ENTER conference, Univerisitat Autonama Barcelona; 10th Enter conference, Tilburg University

Referee for Journal of Economic Theory, Review of Economic studies, Games and Economic Behavior, The Economic Journal, Economic Theory, Review of Economic Design

REFERENCES


PHILIPPE JEHIEL (principal advisor)                                                           
Department of Economics, University College, London and                       
PSE, Paris                                                                                                    
Phone: +33 (0) 1 43 1363 86                                                                       
Email: jehiel@enpc.fr


JACOB GOEREE
HSS California Institute of Technology
Phone: +1 626 395 5800
Email: jkg@hss.caltech.edu


CLAUDIO MEZZETTI
Department of Economics, University of Warwick
Phone: +44 2476150045
Email: C.Mezzetti@warwick.ac.uk